Today's young shun '60s-style values
I spent a couple of hours with Mel Gibson once and it was, as you would expect,
a blissful two hours of adoration (mine). He was charming, shallow, jokey, and
fun. We talked about his upcoming movies, his binge drinking around Hollywood,
his cattle ranch in Australia, his extraordinary success, his six kids. Through
it all, Mel grinned, laughed, chortled, giggled, barked and hooted, like the
man's man he is. And then, without warning, he said, and I'm paraphrasing, "You
know, Vatican II was wrong, a terrible mistake."
It was as if a mask had slipped, and a gargoyle had been revealed under that
bland, handsome face. I wasn't sure what to say, so I stumbled for a few
minutes while he watched me recover, amused, (these interviews play like
competitive tennis, and I couldn't find the ball), and finally, I got back up
on my hind legs, and we soldiered on, as if the moment had never been.
And now we have The Passion, Gibson's version of the last hours of Christ's
life, stripped, apparently, of any Vatican II correctness, and causing waves of
concern, avalanches of essays, mockery, protest and so on.
Much of this concern seems centered around the fact (the critics aren't sure of
their facts) that Gibson might have blamed Christ's death on the Jews, and this
might cause fundamentalist Christians to hate Jews, after decades of
reconciliation.
Not likely. That was then and this is now. Gibson only pretends he's an idiot,
and is, rather, a wildly successful filmmaker and producer, with his handsome
craggy eye keenly focused on every important social ebb and flow of the past 30
years. And like the opposition to gay marriage, which surprises every morally
flaccid boomer I know, including myself, ("whatever" papering over our
disquiet), he's noticed a flood tide coming.
As Bronwen Catherine McShea reports in the summer issue of the journal First
Things, the greying upper-middle class men and (mostly) women who prosecuted
the liberalization of the Church through the last four decades are losing their
influence. Lectures promoting their concerns lie empty, while even at arch-
liberal Harvard, speakers who promote a return to orthodoxy are swamped by
young enthusiasts. The dominant movement in the Catholic Church, one which
apparently only increases in force season to season, is the growing number of
young people who want a traditional church rooted in liturgy.
They are a young, ethnically diverse group who are turning away from "the moral
and philosophical confusions of the '60s" and embracing a Pope "who asserts,
without blushing, his divinely ordained authority to define what is right and
wrong" -- which means that abortion is wrong, pre-marital sex is wrong, gay
marriage is wrong, the ordination of women is wrong, divorce is wrong, and only
celebrating the mystery of marriage and the difference between the sexes will
lead us back to a culture of life.
A 2000 Gallup youth survey found that teenagers identified most strongly with
"religious" (55%) instead of "spiritual but not religious" (39% ) or "religious
and spiritual" (2%), a shift which Phyllis Tickle, a contributing editor at
Publishers Weekly calls "huge." In 2001, the Hartford Institute for Religion
Research released Faith Communities Today, the largest survey of U.S.
congregations ever conducted. The survey showed a surge in new church
development among evangelical and Mormon congregations, and a decline in
Catholic and mainline Protestant churches.
The insistence on high moral standards was the correlative factor for growth.
"A large majority of the most vital congregations report that they have a
clarity of purpose and explicit member expectations that are strictly
enforced," noted the Institute.
In dioceses where bishops are considered orthodox, they ordain nearly five
times as many priests as those run by liberal bishops.
Why? The brightest, most committed and selfless of the first generation to grow
up sexually liberated reject liberation entirely, because they have felt most
keenly the results in their lives, and, furthermore, have seen it wreck havoc
in the lives of their friends. There are still enough old-fashioned families
around for comparison. As a result, the proportion of anti-abortion sentiment
has declined steadily since 1990, and is highest in the under-30 group, leading
even Salon Magazine to worry in 2001, that abortion was losing support. For
those who lived through the sexual revolution as vulnerable children, as Maggie
Gallagher says in What Marriage is For, sexual liberalism has "created millions
of fatherless children and entire neighbourhoods where lifelong marriage is no
longer customary, driving up poverty, crime, teen pregnancy, welfare
dependency, drug abuse, mental and physical health problems." I'd go further to
say that the sexual revolution has created an underclass so degraded and
unhappy, it threatens our collective health.
The paranoid among us might think that that was the plan all along.
Bureaucratic elites prefer the chaos of a sexually liberated underclass because
it means a never-ending source of clients. Strong marriages, as Gallagher
points out, have, in every culture, been critical for elite success, and in
many cultures, children born out of wedlock have been throwaways, good for
fodder, as cheap labour, as prey. A societal norm, like marriage, ensured a
measure of stability that could allow a working class or poor family to have
one solid thing to depend upon, the marriage that would not fail. This is no
longer the case, and she argues that gay marriage would only give more power to
the idea that marriage is for the gratification of adults rather than the
protection of children, and the health of the culture.
The young religious of every faith apparently reject self- gratification as the
meaning of life. More tolerant, but less liberal, the point, they say, is not
to grab as much pleasure and stuff as possible but to nurture the human
community and grow in virtue towards God. Thank that God that in a post-modern
culture, even these heretics must have a seat at the table.